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Introduction
How should one update one's belief given new ev idence? If beliefs are expressed in terms of proba bility, then the standard approach is to use condi tioning. If an agent's original estimate of the prob ability of A is given by Pr(A), and then some new evidence, say B, is acquired, then the new estimate is given by the conditional probability Pr(AIB), defined as Pr(A n B)/Pr(B).1
The Dempster-Shafer approach to reasoning about uncertainty [Sha76] has recently become quite popular in expert systems applications (see, for example, [Abe88, Fal88, LU88, LG83] ). This approach uses belief functions, a class of functions that satisfy three axioms, somewhat related to the axioms of probability. In this paper, we consider how to define a. notion of conditional belief, which generalizes conditional probability.
One definition for conditional belief was already suggested by Dempster [Dem67J, and is derived us ing the rule of combination; hereafter we refer to Dempster's definition a.s the DS definition of con ditional belief. Although the DS definition also gen eralizes conditional probability, it is well known to give counterintuitive results in a. number of situa tions (see, e.g., [Ait68, Bla87, Dia78, DZ82, Hun87, Lem86, Pea.88, Pea.89, Za.d84]) We provide here a. new definition of conditional belief, which also generalizes conditional probability, but is different from the DS definition in general. We can show that our definition avoids many of the problems as sociated with the DS definition.
The motivation for our definition of conditional belief comes from probability theory. It is well known that a. belief function Bel is the lower en 'l!elope of the family of a.ll probability functions Pr consistent with Bel. That is, Bel( A) is the infimum of Pr(A), where the infimum is taken over a.ll pro . b a.bility functions Pr such that Bel( A') � Pr(A') for a.ll A'. 2 We define Bel(AIB) to be the lower enve lope of the family of a.ll functions Pr(·IB) where Pr is consistent with Bel (similarly to the situa tion with conditional probability, we assume that Bel(B) > 0, so that everything is well defined). Although we define Bel( ·I B) in terms ofa.lower en velope, we show that there is an elegant closed form expression for it. Moreover, we can show that just a.s the conditional probability function is in fact a probability function, our conditional belief function is a belief function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review belief functions and de fine our notion conditional belief. We show how it compares to the DS notion by applying both defi-nitions to the well-known three pri1oner1 problem [Gar61, Dia78] . We then conduct a more thor ough investigation of the diff erences between the two notions, and their relationship to conditional probability, showing why the DS notion occasion ally provides counterintuitive answers. In Section 4 we discuss the relationship between belief functions and sets of probability functions. We conclude in Section 5 with some discussion on the implications of our results to the use of belief functions.
2
Updating belief functions
Recall that a probability space is a tuple ( S, X, Pr ), where Sis the sample space, X is a collection of sub sets of S containing S and closed under complemen tation and countable union, and Pr is a probability function defined on X. Note that Pr is defined not on all subsets of S, but only on the sets in X, tra ditionally called the mea1urable sets. Subsets of S not in X are called nonmea1urable.
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [Sha76] provides an approach to attaching likelihoods to events that is different from probability theory. The theory starts out with a belief function. For every event (i.e., set) A, the belief in A, denoted Bel( A), is a number in the interval [0, 1] that places a lower bound on likelihood of A. We have a corresponding number Pl(A) = 1-Bel( A ), called the plausibility of A, which places an upper bound on the likelihood of A. Thus, to every event A we can attach the in terval [Bel(A), Pl(A)]. Like a probability measure, a belief function assigns a "weight" to subsets of a set S, but unlike a probability measure, the domain of a belief function is always taken to be all subsets of S. Formally, a belief function Bel on a set Si s a function Bel: 2 5 -+ [0, 1] satisfying:
We remark that a probability function defined on all of 2 5 is easily seen to be a belief function.
In a companion paper [HF90] , we argue that there are two quite distinct ways of relating be lief functions to probability theory. One approach views belief as a generalized probability; the sec ond views it as a way of representing evidence. H we would like to update beliefs, then it seems most appropriate to view beliefs as generalized probabil ities. There are a number of ways of doing this 318 [Dem67, Dem68, FH89b, Kyb87, Sha79] . We fo cus on one here, since it is perhaps the most well known: that is the approach of viewing a belief function as an infimum of a family of probability functions. Given a set 1' of probability functions all defined on a sample space S, define the lower en11elope of 1' to be the function J such that for each A� S, we have f(A) = inf {Pr(A) : Pr E 1'}.
We have the corresponding definition of the upper en '!I elope of 1'. It was already known to Dempster [Dem67) 
Bel be the set of all probability functions defined on 2 5 consistent with Bel. The next theorem tells us that the belief function Bel is the lower envelope of 1'Bel1 and Pl is the upper envelope. We remark that the converse to Theorem 2.1 does not hold: not every lower envelope is a be lief function. Counterexamples are well known [Bla87, Dem67, Kyb87] . We return to this issue in Section 3.
Theorem 2.1 suggests how we might update a belief function to a conditional belief function (and a plausibility function to a conditional plau1ibility function). We define:
Pl(AIB) = sup Pr(AiB).
P•E'Psel
It is not hard to see that the infimum and supre mum above are not well-defined unless Bel( B) > 0; therefore, we define Bel(AIB) and Pl(AIB) only if Bei(B) > 0. It is straightforward to check that if Bel is actually the probability function Pr, then Bel( AlB) = Pr(AIB). Thus, our definition of con ditional belief generalizes that of conditional prob ability. Note that taking B = true in the preceding It is well known that the conditional probability function is a probability function. That is, if we start with a probability function Pr on S, and B is a subset of S such that Pr(B) > 0, then the func tion Pr(·IB) is a probability function. We might hope that the same situation holds with belief func tions, so that the conditional belief and plausibility functions are indeed belief and plausibility func tions. Given our definitions of conditional belief and plausibility as lower and upper envelopes, it is not clear that this should he so, since lower and up per envelopes of arbitrary sets of probability func tions do not in general result in belief and plau sibility functions. Fortunately, as the next result shows, in this case they do. Thus, we have a way of updating belief and plausibility functions to give us new belief and plausibility functions in the light of new information. The proof of Theorem 2.3 is somewhat difficult. We outline the proof in the appendix; full details can be found in the full paper [FH89a] . We remark 319 that this result-which we view as the main tech nical result of the paper-appears in none of the papers cited above that contain the expression for conditional belief from Tlteorem 2.2. In [dCLM90] the question of whether Bel( ·I B) is a belief function is discussed, but left unanswered.
As we mentioned in the introduction, our defi nition is quite different from that given by Demp ster. Given a belief function Bel , Dempster defines a conditional belief function Bel(·IIB) as follows [Sha76, p. 97]: 3
The corresponding plausibility function is shown to satisfy:
A brief glance at the DS definition compared with the formula in Theorem 2.2 should convince the reader that in general these two definitions of con ditional belief will not agree. It is easy to show that both definitions of conditional belief general ize the standard definition of conditional probabil ity as long as all sets are measurable, that is, have a probability assigned to them. The key difference turns out to be in the way they treat nonmeasurable sets. (See [FH89b] for a discussion of nonmeasur able sets and their relationship to belief functions.) We return to this issue below; we first consider an example that highlights the diff erences between the two approaches.
Example: In order to compare our updating tech nique with that of Dempster, we consider the well known three prisoner11 problem.4
Of three prisoners a, b, and c, two are to be executed but a does not know which. He therefore says to the jailer, "Since ei ther b or c is certainly going to be ex ecuted, you will give me no information about my own chances if you give me the name of one man, either b or c, who is go ing to be executed." Accepting this argu ment, the jailer truthfully replies, "b will be executed." Thereupon a feels happier 1Dempacer't definition is uaually given aa a special ap plication of a more {eneral 1'Uie of combination for belief functions. It would take us too far afield here co discuaa the rule of combination; aee the companion paper (HF90] because before the jailer replied, his own chance of execution was two-thirds, but afterwards there are only two people, him self and c, who could be the one not ex ecuted, and so his chance of execution is one-half.
Note that in order for a to believe that his own chance of execution was two-thirds before the jailer replied, he seems to be implicitly assuming that the one to get pardoned is chosen at random from among a, b, and c. We make this assumption ex plicit in the remainder of our discussion. By assumption, each of these three events has prob ability 1/3.
The event that the jailer says b, which we de note aaya-b, corresponds to the set {(a, b), (c, b)}; the story does not give us a probability for this event. In order to do a Bayesian analysis of the situation, we will need this probability. Note that we do know that the probability of {(c, b)} is 1/3; we just need to know the probability of {(a, b)}.
This depends on the jailer's strategy in the one case that he has free choice, namely when a lives. He gets to choose between saying b and c in that case. We need to know the probability that he says b, i.e., Pr( aaya-bjlivea-a ).
If we assume that the jailer chooses at ran dom between saying b and c if a is pardoned, so that Pr( aaya-bjlivea-a) = 1/2, then Pr( {(a, b)}) = Pr( {(a, c)})= 1/6, and Pr(aaya-b) = 1/2. We can now easily compute that Pr( livea-ajaaya-b) = Pr(livea-a n aaya-b)/Pr(aaya-b)
(1/6)/(1/2) = 1/3. This says that if a:#; 1/2 (i.e., if the jailer had a par ticular preference for answering either b or c when a was the one pardoned) , then a would learn some thing from the answer, in that he would change his estimate of the probability that he will be executed.
For example, if a: = 0, then if a is pardoned, the jailer will definitely say c. Thus, if the jailer actu ally says b, then a knows that he is definitely not pardoned, i.e., that Pr(livea-aiaaya-b) = 0. Sim ilarly, if a: = 1, then a knows that if either he or c is pardoned, then the jailer will say b, while if b is pardoned the jailer will say c. Given that the jailer says b, then from a's point of view the one pardoned is equally likely to be him or c; thus, Pr(live•-al•ays-b) = 1/2. As a: ranges from 0 to 1, it is easy to check that Pr(livea-aiaaya-b) ranges from 0 to 1/2.
How can we capture this situation using a belief function? It seems reasonable that if Bel is the be lief function and PI the corresponding plausibility function used to capture the situation, then Bel should agree with probability function where the probability is known, so that, a priori, both the belief and plausibility of the events li'll es-a, li'll es-b, and li'IJt:s-c should be 1/3. All we know about the a priori probability of says-b is that it lies between 1/3 and 2/3: it is at least the probability that c is chosen (since in that case the jailer must say b), and it cann ot be more than the probability that b is not chosen. Thus, we assume that Bel satis fies Bel(aay-b) = 1/3 and Pl(aay-b) = 2/3. Simi larly, we can argue that Bel( live a-a n aaya-b) = 0 while Pl(livea-a n aaya-b) = 1/3. Plugging these numbers into our formulas, it is easy to compute range [0, 1/2] computed by our notion of condition ing is easy to explain: it is precisely the range de termined by letting the probability that the jailer will say b in the one situation that he has a choice between saying b and c, namely, when a is the one pardoned, range from 0 to 1. The fact that our definition gives this range is not an accident! It is a direct consequence of our definitions and Theo rem 2.2. The range [1/2, 1/2] determined by the DS no tion of conditioning seems much more mysterious. The answer 1/2 corresponds to the situation where the jailer says b whenever he can (i.e., whenever a is pardoned or c is pardoned). Why is this a reason able answer? More importantly, why does it arise? Is there a natural probabilistic interpretation for it?
In the full paper, we consider this issue in detail. The following construction, which is a generaliza tion of the "beehive" example in [SK89] (as well as being a formalization of some comments made in [dCLM90] ), may help provide a partial explana tion.
Suppose a set S is partitioned into (nonempty) disjoints sets X1, ••• , Xk. An agent chooses X; with probability a; (where a1 + · · · + ak = 1) and then chooses z: E X; with some unknown probability. Given subsets A and B of S, we want to know what the probability is that the element z: chosen is in A, and the probability that x is in A given that it is in B. H A = X;, then it is clear that the probability that x E A is a;. However, if A is not one of the X;'s, then all we can compute are upper and lower bounds on the probability.
Let 'P be the set of probability functions on S consistent with this situation; namely, Pr E 'P iff Pr(X;) = a;, fori= 1, ... , k. Let Bel be the lower envelope of 'P; it is not hard to show that Bel is a belief function (we do so in the full paper). It seems reasonable to argue that the best lower and upper bounds we can give on the probability that z: E A are Bel(A) and Pl(A). Similarly, the best lower and upper bounds we can give on the probability that z: E A given that x E B are given by the infimum and supremum of {Pr(AIB) : Pr E 'P}. These are precisely Bel(AIB) and Pl(AIB). Now suppose we slightly change the rules of the game. We are told that the probabilistic process that chooses an element in X; will definitely choose an element in B if possible. This does not affect anything if X; � B or if X; � B. However, if X; n B #-0 and X; n B #-0, then, rather than choosing X; with probability a;, the probability is now redistributed so that X; n B is chosen with probability a;, while X; n B is chosen with proba-321 bility 0. The probability that used to be spread over all of X; is now concentrated on X; n B. What is the probability that an element of A is chosen given that the element chosen is definitely in B with re spect to this new process, where an element of B is chosen whenever possible? We now have to con sider the family 'P' of probability functions consis tent with this new process, and take the infimum and supremum of {Pr'(AIB) : Pr E 'P'}. As we show in the full paper, these bounds are given by Bel(AIJB) and Pl(AIIB).
Suppose we now reconsider the three prisoners problem from this point of view. We can now see that Bel(lives-aiJsays-b) gives the probability that a lives given the extra hypothesis that the jailer says b whenever possible. In particular, this means that the jailer definitely says b if a is the one that is pardoned; i.e., Pr( says-bJlives-a) = 1. Under this revised situation, the probability that a lives given that the jailer says b is indeed ex actly 1/2. With this understanding of the DS no tion of updating, the result Bel(lives-aJJsays-b) = Pl(lives-aJJsays-b) = 1/2 should come as no sur prise.
To sununarize, this discussion has shown that Bel(AIIB) corresponds to a somewhat unnatural updating process, where before we condition with respect to B, we first try to choose an element in B whenever possible. In terms of the process discussed above, it is easy to see that this extra step before updating makes no differen�e if B is the union of some of the X; 's. This amounts to B being a measurable set. It will make a difference if B is not measurable. This is the case in the three prisoner problem, where says-b is not a measurable set, and is the cause of the answer 1/2 that we get when we try to apply DS conditioning in this case.
We remark that this analysis can also be used to explain the well-known observation that Bel(AIB) � Bel(AIIB) � Pl(AIIB) � Pl(AIB) ( [Dem67, Dem68] ; see also [Kyb87] ). Not only does it show why the interval defined by [Bel( AlB), Pl(AIB)] contains that defined by [Bel(AIIB), Pl(AIIB)], it explains when and why we get equality. See the full paper for details. 
Belief functions and lower en velopes
Theorem 2.1 says that each belief function is the lower envelope of a set of probability functions, and each plausibility function an upper envelope. Un fortunately, the lower envelope of an arbitrary set of probability functions is not in general a belief function, nor is the upper envelope of an arbitrary set of probability functions in general a plausibil ity function. Nevertheless, results such as Theo rem 2.3 show that there are natural sets of proba bility functions that do induce belief and plausibil ity functions. Although a general characterization is lacking, further examples in [FH89b, HF90] sug gest that this is not an isolated example.
However, even if a set P of probability functions does induce a belief and plausibility function, say Bel and PI, it is reasonable to ask whether we should represent P by Bel and Pl. Clearly the answer depends very much on the intended appli cation. However, it is worth noting that this rep resentation of P might result in a loss of valuable information. For example, consider a sample space consisting of three points, say {a, b, c}. Let P con sist of all probability functions on S with the follow ing three properties: (1) 1/4 � Pr({a}) � 1/2, (2) 1/4 � Pr({b}) � 1/2, and (3) Pr({a}) = Pr({b}). It is not hard to show that the lower envelope of P is a belief function. If we call this belief function Bel and take PI to be the corresponding plausi bility function, we get Bel({a}) = Bel({b}) = 1/4 and PI( {a}) = PI( {b}) = 1/2. Thus, we retain the information that the probability of a and b both range between 1/4 and 1/2. However, we have lost the information that the probabilities of a and b are the same in all the probability func tions in P. This loss of information has some se rious repercussions. As we show in the full paper (by extending the example above), one consequence is that updates do not commute. More precisely, suppose we start with a belief function Bel on a set S, observe B � S and then observe C � S. The result is the belief function BeiB(·IC), where Be18(A) = Bei(AIB). Similarly, if we observe C and then B, we get the belief function Belc(·IB). We might hope that for all sets A, we would have Be18(AIC) = Belc(AIB) = Bei(AIBAC). That is, observing B then C should be the same as observ ing C then B, which in turn should be the same as observing B A C. This is certainly the case if Bel is a probability function, but not in general. It turns out that the problem here is that informa tion is lost as we update the belief function. (See the full paper for further details of this issue.) By way of contrast, the DS rule of conditioning is com mutative. Conditioning with respect to C and then with respect to B is equivalent to conditioning with respect to B A C. However, as we have pointed out, it has other problems when viewed as a technique for updating beliefs.
These observations suggest to us that the ques tion of the "best" representation of evidence does 322 not have a unique answer. It may be easier to com pute with a pair of belief and plausibility functions than to have to carry around a whole set of prob ability functions. Nevertheless, since information may be lost in this process, this ease of computation comes at a cost. (See [Pea89] for further examples of this phenomenon.) 4 
Conclusions
We have defined a new notion of conditional belief, distinct from the DS notion, that seems to lead to more intuitive results. Our notion also allows us to avoid some paradoxes associated with the DS no tion. For example, we would expect that if both an agent's belief in a proposition p given q and his belief in p given -.q are at least a:, then his belief in p should be at least a:, whether or not he learns anything about q. This is essentially what Sav age [Sav54] has called the sure thing principle. It is easy to see that conditional probability satisfies the sure thing principle, but the DS conditioning rule does not (see [Pea89] for an example). On the other hand, it is easy to see that our notion of conditioning does satisfy the sure thing principle. For suppose we have an arbitrary belief function Bel such that Bel(plq) � a: and Bel(pl-.q) � a:. Choose an arbitrary probability function Pr com patible with Bel. By our definition of conditional belief as an infimum, we see that Pr(plq) � a: and Pr(pl-.q) � a:. So Pr(p) � a:. Thus, Pr(p) � a: for all probability functions Pr compatible with Bel. So, from Theorem 2.1, it follows that Bel(p) �a:.
Although our results show that belief functions can play a useful role even when one wants to think probabilistically, the observations of the previous section do show that information can be lost if we pass to belief functions. This suggests they should be used with care.
One thing we have not really discussed in this paper is what is considered perhaps the key com ponent of the Dempster-Shafer approach, namely, the rule of combination. This rule is a way of com bining two belief functions to obtain a third one. The reason we have not discussed it is that we feel that the rule of combination does not fit in well with the viewpoint of belief functions as a general ization of probability functions that is discussed in this paper. However, there is another way of view ing belief functions, which is as representations of evidence. This is in fact the view taken in [Sha76] . When belief is viewed as a representation of evi dence, then the rule of combination becomes more appropriate. These issues are discussed in more de tail in a companion paper [HF90] . Intuitively, m( A) is the weight of evidence for A that has not already been assigned to some proper subset of A. With this interpretation of mass, we would expect that an agent's belief in A is the sum of the masses he has assigned to all the subsets of A;
i.e., Bel(A) = :E n c A m(B). Indeed, this intuition is correct.
- 
Thus, once we show that Bel(·I B) is a belief func tion, it will immediately follow that Pl(·I B) is the corresponding plausibility function.
Let Bel' be the function defined on 28 such that for each subset A of B, Bel'(A) = Bel(A)/(Bel(A) + Pl(A n B)).
It clearly suffices to show that Bel' is a belief function, since for all subsets C of S, we have Bel(CI B) = Bel'(C n B). Once We now define a function m", whose domain is {A11 ... ,A,.,B1, ... ,Bt}•, the set of finite strings over the alphabet consisting of the names of the sets with positive mass that intersect B. (We shall usually not bother to distinguish between a set and the name of a set, but, as we shall see, it is con venient to consider explicitly strings of names of sets.) First, we let m" ( B;) = !3i, for 1 ::::; i ::::; t. As sume now that we have defined m" ( Bi A h .. · A i, ) whenever s < r and j1 < · · · < j,. Assume that
{3j
(1)
If A is not of the form BiAh .. · Aj. with i1 < . . · < j., then m"(A) = 0.
We are now ready to define the alleged mass func tion m'. If X is the string Bi Ah · · · Aj,, where i 1 < · · · < j., then we say that X represents the set given by Bi U Ah U • · · U Aj,. We would like to let m' be simply m" (that is, by letting m' ap plied to a set be equal to m" applied to a string that represents the set, and let m'(A) = 0 for sets not of the form Bi Ah · · · Aj. ). The problem is that several distinct strings may represent the same set; for example, it is quite possible that, say, the sets B1 U A1 and B2 U A4 U As are the same. We define m'(A) to be Lx represents A m"( X). For example, if the set A equals both B1 U A1 and B2 U A4 U As, but if A is not of the form B; U Ail · · · U Aj. for any other choices of B;, Ail, ... , Aj. with il < · · · < j ,, then m'(A) = m"(B1A!) + m"(B2A4As). We shall prove that m' is a mass function, and that Bel'(A) = L c cA m'(C). This will show that Bel' is a belief funct"'i on. Thus, we must show that Now (C) follows from (D), since it is easy to see that Bel'(B) = 1. So we need only prove (B). The proof of (B) involves some nontrivial combinatorial arguments; the details can be found in the full pa per. I We remark that in response to an early draft of this paper, Zhang [Zha89] constructed a proof along very different lines (although also quite com plicated).
